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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(1953), as amended, whereby a defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital
felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the Judge John C. Backlund ignored the weight of the
evidence and made clearly erroneous findings of fact in
convicting Matthew Auffhammer (hereinafter "Auffhammer") of
driving under the influence?
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, are reviewed using a "clearly erroneous" standard.
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990).

Case law and

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure give a clear
directive that in applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review, deference must be given to the opportunity for the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Recently the

Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this requirement;
We give deference to the initial decision maker on
questions of fact because it stands in a superior
position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence
and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses /
recollections.
Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
1997) .

1

In order for Auffhammer to show clear error, he must first
present all of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings
and then "demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack." Moosman at 476.
For an appellate court to hold a finding clearly erroneous,
the trial court , s findings of fact must be "against the great
weight of evidence" or the reviewing court must be "definitely
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v.
Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a)
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. (See addendum for full text.)
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(2) (1953), as amended
A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On the evening of June 30, 1996, Auffhammer went out looking
for an apartment, but ended up at a gathering that was described
as an "alcohol party".

(Tr. at 22, 26-27, attached as an

addendum to Appellants brief.)

Over a period of several hours
2

at this party, Auffhammer was seen drinking alcoholic beverages,
(Tr. at 27, 38, 52.)

Auffhammer met Garth Rasmussen (hereinafter

"Rasmussen") at this party and eventually the two men left the
party together, as Auffhammer was going to let Rasmussen spend
the night at his home in Alpine, Utah.

(Tr. at 27, 29-30.)

As they traveled toward Alpine, Auffhammer was slow to react
to one stop sign, starting to stop and then passing by the stop
sign a little, which caused his passenger to be critical of his
driving.

(Tr. at 58-59.) l

Shortly thereafter, Auffhammer ¥as

speeding at approximately forty miles an hour in a twenty—five
mile per hour zone as he approached the "T" intersection of 1300
West and 2600 North in Pleasant Grove.

(Tr. at 30-31, 32, 54.)

The stop sign posted at the intersection was clearly visible that
night.

(Tr. at 14, 76-75.)

However, Auffhammer failed to stop

at the stop sign, (Tr. at 31-32), and his vehicle careened across
2600 North, a major byway in the area, jumped a ditch (Tr. at
32), and crashed into a vehicle parked in the driveway of a home
across the road from the stop sign.

(Tr. at 45.)

TThen

Auffhammer7s car finally came to rest, approximately 15 feet away
from the parked vehicle that Auffhammer had struck, (Tr. at 1718), both Auffhammer and his passenger were momentarily
unconscious and there was extensive damage to both vehicles.
(Tr. at 11, 33, 45-46.)

After a short time had passed, Rasmussen

x

The record is unclear whether Auffhammer ever came to a
complete stop at the first stop sign.
3

regained consciousness and awoke Auffhammer.

(Tr. at 33-34, 45.)

The two men, injured and bleeding from the crash, exited the car.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 30, 1996, Brad Bryan, the
owner of the home and the parked car that Auffhammer collided
with, was awakened by the sudden sound of a crash.

(Tr. at 68.)

Mr. Bryan did not hear any brakes squealing, gravel skidding, or
any other similar type of sound other than the sudden crashing
noise of Auffhammer's car as it impacted the vehicle parked ±n
the driveway.

(Tr. at 69.)

"basically" demolished.

Mr. Bryan walked out to find his car

(Tr. at 70). He also saw Auffhammer and

Rasmussen standing next to the other car, talking.
71.)

(Tr. at 70-

His first impression was that the two men had been

drinking.

(Tr. at 74.)

Mr. Bryan later testified that there was

"really no question in [his] mind that they been drinking." (Tr.
at 74, lines 4-7.)

From where he was, Mr. Bryan did not detect

the odor of alcohol, (Tr. at 7 8 ) , but he did notice that both men
were groggy, their speech was a bit slurred, and they were having
a tough time holding themselves up.

(Tr. at 74.)

Mr. Bryan went

back into his home to call the police.
At about this time, Auffhammer told his passenger "let's get
out of here." (Tr.. at 34, 36*)

Despite Rasmussen's efforts to

convince Auffhammer to stay at^ the scene of the crash, Auffhammer
stammered some "incoherent" statements and ran off without
waiting to talk to either the owner of the parked vehicle or the
police.

(Tr. at 36-37, 71.)

When Mr. Bryan returned after
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calling the police, only Rasmussen remained at the scene,

(Tr.

at 71.)
A short time later, Officer Michael Smith responded to the
accident.

(Tr. at 10.)

He interviewed Rasmussen, who identified

himself as the passenger.

Officer Smith was unable to talk with

Auffhammer at that time because Auffhammer had left the accident
scene.

(Tr. at 18, 21.)

In speaking to Officer Smith, Rasmussen

made statements to the effect that he had met Auffhammer at an
"alcohol party", (Tr. at 27), that Auffhammer was traveling ^rt H
high rate of speed, (Tr. at 3 0-31), and that Auffhammer was
intoxicated ^andthat Rasmussen knew lie should never have gotten
into the car with him.

(Tr. at 31.)

Rasmussen «al€o complained

of injuries to his back and arm and,Officer Smith discovered
quite a bit of blood in both the driver's and passenger's
compartments of Auffhammer/s car.

(Tr. at 18-19.)

The next day Officer Jared Clark interviewed Auffhammer at
the American Fork hospital.

(Tr. at 60-61.) Officer Clark read

Auffhammer his Miranda rights, (Tr. at 62), and inquired into the
injuries Auffhammer had sustained.

(Tr. at 62-63.)

Auffhammer

responded that he had been walking in a field and hit his head.
(Tr. at 63.) Officer Clark then asked Auffhammer if he had been
in an accident and whether or not he had been drinking the night
before.

Auffhammer answered no to both questions.

(Id.)

Officer Clark then asked if Auffhammer knew that his friend had
been hurt in the accident, to which Auffhammer responded that

5

Rasmussen was not his friend, but that he was just giving him a
ride home,

(Id.)

On July 3, 1997, Officer Smith went to Auffhammer's home to
speak with him about the accident.

(Tr. at 21.)

After reading

Auffhammer his Miranda rights, Officer Smith asked him about the
accident, to which Auffhammer responded that he did not remember
getting in an accident.

(Tr.at 22.)

When Auffhammer was asked

about injuries that were apparent on his body, he answered that
he had received them as a result of the accident.

(Tr. at 23^)

When told about the statements Rasmussen had made, Auffhammer
denied them, stating that he had not been drinking that night and
that he did not even drink alcohol.

(Tr. at 22-23.)

Approximately two weeks before the trial, Auffhammer
contacted Rasmussen and talked "a little bit" to him about his
testimony.

(Tr. at 53-55.)

At the trial, Auffhammer argued that there was not enough
evidence to conclude he was under the influence or that his
xiriving was impaired.
otherwise.

(Tr* at 87.)

(Tr. at 89.)

Judge Backlund found

Even though at trial Rasmussen

unequivocally answered "yes" to the prosecutor/s question
regarding if, at the party, he had seen Auffhammer "drinking any
alcoholic beverages", (Tr. at 27), Judge Backlund found
Rasmussen 7 s testimony to be "substantially" hedged and toned down
from the statements made to the police.

To the court, this

seemed to be a result of Auffhammer's recent contact with
Rasmussen and Rasmussen's desire to let "bygones be bygones".
6

(Tr. at 91-92.)

Also, the court pointed out the flawed logic in

Auffhammer,s claim that he was so affected by his injuries as to
render him insensible, and yet he was able to walk several miles
in the dark to find the hospital.

(Tr. at 93.)

Judge Backlund

also found it "almost ludicrous" to think that Auffhammer did not
know the road, a major byway in the area, did not go through.
(Tr. at 90-91.)

The court also found the obvious lies Auffhammer

told to the police to be a major factor that indicated his
intention to cover up an intoxicated state and avoid a conviction
for DUI, as there would be no other reason for Auffhammer izo
leave the scene and then to lie about his involvement in the
accident.

(Tr. at 89-90, 92-93.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

While Auffhammer has marshaled portions of the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings of fact, he has failed to
marshal all of the evidence as required under the standard of
review.

Case law has established that when an appellant

challenges a trial court's findings of fact but fails to marshal
all of the evidence in support of the findings there arises a
presumption that the record supports the trial court's findings
of fact and that those findings will not be disturbed by the
appellate court.
A major portion of the trial court's decision was based on
Judge Backlund's determination of the witnesses' credibility.
a finder of fact, Judge Backlund properly used his ability to
view the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess the live
7

As

testimony at trial to formulate his findings of fact. Both case
law and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure give a
clear directive that deference must be given to the fact finder's
superior position to assess witnesses7 testimony.

Therefore,

this Court should hold that Judge Backlund's findings are not
clearly erroneous and should uphold Auffhammer/s conviction.
Finally, Auffhammer/s failure to marshal all of the evidence
supporting the^trial court's findings precludes his claim of
insufficient evidence, as such a failure gives rise to the
presumption that the record supports the trial court's finding,
-However, even if the record is reviewed, there is more than
sufficient evidence to support Judge Backlund's findings.

An

appellant contesting findings must set forth all evidence the
trial court heard in the light most favorable to the findings in
dispute,

Auffhammer has not, and cannot, meet the burden of

proving that the evidence presented during the trial was
insufficient to support the trial court findings,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT.
In challenging the findings of fact, Auffhammer has a heavy
burden.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a),

findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous."

To prove that a finding is "clearly erroneous" an

appellant must "first marshal all of' the evidence supporting the
finding,"

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins, Co., 766 P.2d 896, 899
8

(Utah 1989) (emphasis

added,

see

Addendum).

This requirement of

marshaling the evidence is an important function that reminds
both the "litigants and the appellate courts of the broad
deference owed to the fact finder at trial."

State v. Moore, 802

P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Because of the important function marshaling plays in
reviewing a trial court's findings of facts, all of the evidence
supporting the findings must be marshaled or the courts will
presume the trial court's findings to be supported by the record.
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 3 0 {Utah
1997); Macris & Assoc, v. Images & Attitudef 319 Utah -Adv^ Uep^
33, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

An appellant cannot simply present

a portion of the evidence and then argue the evidence is
insufficient.

If there is a failure to marshal all of the

evidence, the court will assume the record supports the trial
court and will not, therefore, disturb the lower court's factual
findings.

Macris, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.

In his brief, Auffhammer marshaled some of the evidence
presented at trial that supports Judge Backlund's findings*
However, Auffhammer has not met the heavy burden he faces in that
he failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings.

The following is a compilation of facts

supporting Judge Backlund's finding that Auffhammer failed to
present in his brief.
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1.

Rasmussen admitted that when first questioned by the

police, he had described the party he and Auffhammer had attended
as an "alcohol party".
2.

(Tr. at 22, 26-27.)

Rasmussen unequivocally testified that while at the

"alcohol party," he had seen Auffhammer drinking alcoholic
beverages (Tr. at 27).
3.

Rasmussen testified he told the police that on the way

home from the party, Auffhammer was traveling at a high rate of
speed.
4.

(Tr. at 3 0 ) .
Rasmussen testified that Auffhammer had "started to

stop but, he passed the stop sign a little bit" at a previous
stop sign before the intersection where the accident occurred.
(Tr. at 59.)
5.

Rasmussen testified that Auffhammer was slow to react

to the stop sign at the "T" intersection at 13 00 West 2 600 North
that night.
6.

(Tr. at 31, 32.)

Both Officer Smith and Mr. Bryan testified that, on the

night of the crash, the stop sign at the intersection was clearly
visible from some distance back.
7*

(Tr. at 14, 76-77.)

Mr. Bryan testified there was no sound of tires

braking, skidding on gravel, or the like, but only the sudden
sound of the crash as,. Auff hammer's car impacted the vehicle
parked in the driveway.

(Tr. at 69. ) 2

2

The testimony that there were no sounds consistent with
someone trying to react to a stop sign or intersection suggests
that the driver totally failed to respond to the stop sign, a
fact the judge could consider in determining whether the driver's
reflexes were impaired and whether he was able to safely operate
10

8.

Officer Smith testified that after impact, the parked

car came to rest approximately 15 feet from Auffhammer/s vehicle
(Tr. at 17-18), suggesting by the force of the impact that
Auffhammer was slow to react after passing the stop sign, the
intersection, and a ditch.
9.

Rasmussen testified that he tried to persuade

Auffhammer to stay, but that Auffhammer "took off basically"
(Tr. at 36), clearly indicating Auffhammer wanted to avoid being
identified at the scene so shortly after he had been to an
"alcohol party."
J.O. . When questioned about his statements to the police on
that night of the accident, Rasmussen said he "very well could
have" said that Auffhammer was very intoxicated or quite
intoxicated, and that it would have been the truth (Tr. at 53).
11.

Rasmussen testified that Auffhammer had contacted him a

couple of weeks before the hearing and that Auffhammer had asked
him about his testimony (Tr at 53, 54.), which would explain why,
at trial, the witness seemed hesitant to testify or attempted to
hedge in his answers to questions regarding his earlier
statements to the police.
12.

Officer Carter testified that when he asked Auffhammer

if he had been in an accident and if he had been drinking,
Auffhammer told him no.

But that when he asked if Auffhammer

knew his friend had been injured in the accident, Auffhammer

a motor vehicle.
11

responded by saying it was not his friend, he was just giving him
a ride home.
13.

(Tr. at 63.)

Officer*Smith testified that Auffhammer told him^he

could not remember the accident and that Auffhammer did not even
drink alcohol.
14.

(Tr. at 22.)

Mr. Bryan testified that when he first observed

Auffhammer and Rasmussen at the time of the accident, his
impression was that both men had been drinking.
15.

(Tr. at 74.)

Mr. Bryan emphasized his perception that the two men

were intoxicated, by stating there was "really no question in
[his] mind that they had been drinking."

(Id.)

All of these points support Judge Backlund's finding that
Auffhammer had been drinking and that he was impaired on the
night of the accident.

However, it is Auffhammer's burden, not

Pleasant Grove's, to demonstrate how the record supports Judge
Backlund's findings.

Because Auffhammer has failed to fully

marshal the evidence supporting^the trial court's findings, it is
proper for this Court to presume the record supports the findings
and to deny Auffhammer's request to reverse his conviction.
POINT II
DUE REGARD MUST BE GIVEN TO JUDGE mCKLTJND'B
OPPORTUNITY TO JUDGE THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes it
clear that the appellate courts are to give respect and due
regard to the ability of the fact finder to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.

The ability to watch witnesses testify and to

note their demeanor provides an advantage to the trial court that
12

cannot be reproduced thereafter, even through the most skillfully
crafted brief.

Determining facts is a primary function of the

trial court, and relevant case law makes it clear that this
function should be treated with deference, especially when based
on evaluation of conflicting live testimony. In re S.T.. 923 P.2d
393, 399 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting In re Estate of Bartell,
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this standard
of review and the importance of the deference given to the trial
court's findings of fact, stating that the trial court is in a
"superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evitlsnce
and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses'
recollections."

Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utahf Utah Adv. Rep.

3, 4 (Utah 1997).
Although a trial court is not required to recite each
indicia of reasoning that leads to its conclusions or explain why
it found certain witnesses less credible, In re S.T. 923 P.2d at
399, Judge Backlund explained that his perception of Rasmussen's
testimony was a major factor in formulating his findings of fact.
(Tr. at 91-91.)

The finding that Rasmussen was substantially

hedging and changing liis testimony from earlier statements made
to the police and that he had been influenced by communications
Auffhammer had made with him only a few weeks earlier are exactly
the types of credibility judgments that must be given deference
upon review because of the "superior position" of the trial court

13

"to assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses"•

Drake,

Utah Adv. Rep. at 4.
Judge Backlund also had to judge the credibility of
statements made by Mr. Bryan that Auffhammer had slurred speech
and seemed intoxicated, (Tr. at 7 4 ) , compared to testimony from
Rasmussen that Auffhammer/s speech was not slurred.

(Tr. at 40.)

Again, Judge Backlund's ability to listen to live testimony and
to judge the credibility of these two witnesses places him in the
best position to determine what the facts really are.
Judge Backlund's decisions regarding the credibility of the
witnesses had a strong impact on his findings of fact.

43iven the

due regard and deference to his function as a finder of fact,
this Court must be "definitely and firmly convinced" that Judge
Backlund made a mistake that is against the full weight of the
evidence before it overturns his findings of fact.
Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Enalert v.

Nothing in the

trial would give rise to such a "definite conviction" that Judge
Backlund made such a mistake.

This Court should give deference

to Judge Backlund7s findings and affirm the conviction of
Auffhammer.
POINT III
APPELLANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT JUDGE BACKLUND'S
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Auffhammer claims that there is not enough evidence to show
Auffhammer was under the influence of alcohol or that his driving
was thereby impaired.

However, he has failed to completely
14

marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings.

Since Auffhammer has failed to show the evidence

insufficient even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
court's findings, his assertion of a lack of evidence must be
rejected and the record must be presumed to support the trial
court's findings. Heber City Corpf 319 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30;
Macris, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.
Nevertheless, when the record is reviewed there is more than
sufficient evidence to support Judge Backlund's findings and
judgment that Auffhammer was guilty of DUI.

It is not disputed

that Auffhammer was driving the car when it crashed into Mr.
Bryan's parked vehicle.

(Tr. at 87.)

There is testimony that

Auffhammer had been drinking alcohol a short time prior to the
accident, (Tr. at 27, 55), that he had problems stopping at
another stop sign shortly before the accident, (Tr. at 5 9 ) , and
that he was slow to react to the stop sign at the intersection
immediately in front of the scene of the accident.
32.)

(Tr. at 3 1 -

At the scene of the accident, Rasmuss-en told police that

Auffhammer was intoxicated and that Rasmussen should have never
gotten into the car with Auffhammer.

(Tr. at 22.)

In his brief, Auffhammer focuses on two elements of the
offense of DUI as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (1996
Supp.) and claims these elements were not established at trial.
The first element is that the defendant was "under the influence
of alcohol."

Auffhammer then describes the second element as

"whether that influence rendered him 'incapable of operating a
15

vehicle 7 ."

(Appellants brief at 9.)

However, a closer reading

of the statute shows that the prosecution need not prove the
defendant incapable of operating a vehicle, but rather only that
the defendant is "incapable of safely operating a vehicle." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2).

(Emphasis added.)

Sufficient evidence was submitted to, and reviewed by, the
trial court to find both elements necessary for a DUI conviction.
Testimony at trial provided sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's findings of facts.

That evidence showed that on

the evening of June 30, 1996, Auffhammer attended an "alcohol
party" for a period of several hours, during which time he was
seen drinking alcoholic beverages.

Auffhammer left the party

with Rasmussen, who at the time recognized Auffhammer's
impairment.
night.

Rasmussen later testified as to the events of that

As those two men traveled from the party, Auffhammer was

driving.

During that drive, Auffhammer exceeded the speed limit

and was slow to stop at one stop sign, which concerned his
passenger.
As Auffhammer approached the "T" intersection of 1300 West
and 2600 North in Pleasant Grove, the stop sign should have been
apparent to him.
night.

Others testified it was clearly visible that

However, Auffhammer failed to stop at the stop sign.

He

sped through the intersection, jumped a ditch, and crashed into a
vehicle parked in the driveway of the home across the road from
the stop sign.

Auffhammer's vehicle struck the parked vehicle

16

with such force that the second car came to rest approximately 15
feet away from the point of impact.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 30, 1996, Brad Bryan, the
owner of the home across from the intersection, was awakened by
the sudden sound of a crash.

He did not recall hearing brakes

squealing or a car skidding, which one would expect if a person
had missed a stop sign at a "T" intersection.

Mr. Bryan only

heard the sudden crash of Auffhammer's car impacting Mr. Bryan's
vehicle.

Mr. Bryan walked out, saw what had happened, and -saw

Auffhammer and Rasmussen.

There was "really no question in Ihis]

mind that they been drinking." (Tr. at 74, lines 4-7.)

Mr. Bryan

noticed that both men were groggy, their speech was a bit
slurred, and they were having a tough time holding themselves up.
While Mr. Bryan was in the house calling the police,
Auffhammer stammered some "incoherent" statements and fled the
scene.

Rasmussen remained at the scene.

When Officer Michael

Smith spoke with Rasmussen at the scene, that witness stated that
Auffhammer was intoxicated and that Rasmussen knew he should
never have gotten into the car with him.

Rasmussen/s testimony

was less direct at the time of trial, which the judge attributed
to his having had a conversation with the defendant shortly
before the trial.
When Auffhammer was located at the American Fork Hospital,
he told Officer Jared Clark that he had been walking in a field
and hit his head, and that he had not been drinking or in an
accident the night before.

However, Auffhammer then indicated
17

that Rasmussen was not his friend, he was just giving him a ride
home.

Later, Auffhammer told police his injuries resulted from

the accident•

Based on these and other questionable statements

by Auffhammer, the court found his version of the events
unbelievable, and instead relied more on the testimony of
Rasmussen and the officers.
Judge Backlund's. findings of fact are not clearly erroneous,
but are instead supported by the evidence.

Auffhammer has not

met, and cannot meet, his heavy burden of proving the evidence
insufficient to support the findings.

This is especially true as

the record is to be viewed in the light most favorable to Judge
Backlund's findings of fact.

Reid 766 P.2d at 899.

Contrary to the Auffhammer/s assertion that the trial court
"convicted him of the DUI because 'Auffhammer is a liar / n ,
(Appellant's brief at 7 ) , both the testimony presented and the
reasonable inferences from the evidence before the court support
the trial court's findings that Auffhammer had been drinking on
the night in question, that he was driving immediately
thereafter, and that he was impaired to the point of not being
able to safely operate his motor vehicle.
CQNCLTJSTON
Auffhammer , s request that this Court overturn his conviction
for driving under the influence should be denied for three
reasons.

First, Auffhammer failed to marshal all of the evidence

supporting the trial court's findings of fact.

Therefore this

Court should assume that the record supports Judge Backlund's
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findings.

Second, because the factual findings were based on

live testimony and influenced by the lack of credibility of both
Auffhammer and Rasmussen, this Court should give deference to
Judge Backlund,s judgment, as directed by both case law and Rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and affirm
Auffhammer's conviction.
Finally, Auffhammer has failed to show that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support Judge Backlund,s findings of
fact.

Even though it should be assumed that the record supports

Judge Backlund's findings because Auffhammer failed to marshal
all of the evidence, a review of the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court's findings reveals there is more
than sufficient evidence to support those findings.
Pleasant Grove requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's findings of fact and uphold Matthew Auffhammer's
conviction for driving under the influence and leaving the scene
of an accident.
DATED, September l ^-—_ ,

IQQ-7
_ t ^ ^ ,

C. Val
Attorney for the City of Pleasant Grove
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ADDENDUM
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ Rule 52(a)
Rule 52.

Findings by the court.

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A;
in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings
of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in
open court following the close of evidence or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the <x>urt. The
trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when
the motion is based on more than one ground.
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